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PARTIES 
The Child: 
T.L.P. born February 20, 1994. Her father is 
deceased. Her mother is the respondent/appellee. The court 
appointed the Office of the Guardian ad Litem, "the 
Guardian" to represent the Child's best interests. 
The Parents: 
Candice M. Suitter, "the Mother." She is the 
Child's mother. She is the respondent/appellee. 
Kory Pasquin, "the Father," He is the Child's father. 
He is deceased. 
The Grandmother: 
Geri Pasquin, "the Grandmother." She is the 
Child's paternal grandmother. She is appealing the denial of 
her petition for grandparent visitation. 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Geri Pasquin, 
Petitioner/Appellant, 
vs. 
Candice M. Suitter, 
Respondent/Appellee. 
Case No. 20010717-CA 
Priority No. 4 
GUARDIAN ad LITEM'S BRIEF 
JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this case pursuant to Utah R. 
App. P. 4(a) because this is an appeal from a final order regarding visitation effectively 
dismissing the Grandmother's visitation petition. 
ISSUES FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the district court relied on insufficient evidence to support its findings, 
which in turn supported its denial of the grandmother' petition. To raise an insufficiency-
of-evidence claim, the Grandmother must marshal all evidence supporting the challenged 
findings and then demonstrate how the marshaled evidence is legally insufficient to 
support those findings. Campbell v. Campbell 896 P.2d 635, 638 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
2. Whether the quality of the Guardian ad litem's representation is an issue the 
Grandmother may raise on appeal when she has not first raised it to the trial court. State 
v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74 ^ 11. To the extent the claim goes to sufficiency of evidence, the 
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Grandmother bears the burden of marshaling the evidence. Campbell v. Campbell 896 
P.2d 635, 638 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). Moreover, the claim may be one of invited error 
given that it was the Grandmother's petition and she had the burden of producing 
evidence to support it. Utah Code Ann. § 30-5-2(2). 
STATUTES, RULES, CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-5-2(2). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case: The Grandmother appeals a district court order denying her 
petition for visitation. R.548. 
Course of the Proceedings: In December 1997, the Grandmother petitioned the 
district court for visitation to her three year-old granddaughter. R. 1-3. 
Disposition at Trial Court: In April 2000 and May 2001, the court convened an 
evidentiary hearing and entered a written decision in July 2001 denying the petition and 
leaving visitation to the discretion of the Child's Mother. R. 541-47. The Grandmother 
appeals. R.548. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Because the Appellant (the child's paternal grandmother, hereinafter referred to as 
"the Grandmother") challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, the facts are presented in 
the light most favorable to those found by the trier of fact. Tucker v. Tucker, 910 P.2d 
1209, 1216 (Utah 1996). 
The Grandmother's son, Kory Pasquin, died in a boating accident in December 
1996 when the Child was two years old. R.223. After the Father's death, the Mother and 
Grandmother became embroiled in litigation involving a family business. In May of 
1997, less than a year after the Father's death, the Grandmother terminated contact with 
the Child. R.541-47. Six months later, in December 1997, the Grandmother petitioned 
for grandparent visitation. R. 1 -3. 
The domestic relations commissioner recommended that a guardian ad litem be 
appointed to represent the best interests of the minor Child. The Mother objected to the 
appointment of any guardian ad litem. R.23; 43-45. 
At a hearing on the Mother's objection, the judge was emphatic that the matter not 
proceed without the assistance of a guardian ad litem: "We aren't doing anything till we 
have a guardian ad litem We need a guardian ad litem appointed. Now, what's 
standing between the people in this room sitting in front of the bar there and getting a 
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guardian ad litem appointed?" R.555 at 23-25; R.160. The Office of the Guardian ad 
Litem was notified and the Guardian soon entered her notice of appearance. R.184. 
Again, the Mother's attorney objected to the appointment and urged the Guardian to 
stipulate to a vacation of her appointment. R. 193; 210-13. The Guardian set up a time 
for the Mother to bring the Child in for an interview. The Mother did not show, did not 
call to cancel and did not call to reschedule. R.308-10. 
The Guardian, in her report to the court, urged the court to order the Mother to 
cooperate and to allow her access to the Child. R.308-10. 
The Guardian appeared at what was to be the evidentiary hearing. R.319. The 
court was not happy to learn she had been denied access to the Child: "We're not going 
to have an evidentiary hearing because the reality is the guardian ad litem is going to be 
on board. And I'm going to order cooperation with the guardian ad litem. . . I will now 
repeat, the guardian ad litem is now assigned the responsibility of giving me advice 
concerning the best interests of the child." R.555 at 38-39. 
Finally, the Guardian ad litem, along with a clinical consultant, was able to meet 
with the Child. By the time of the evidentiary hearing, a different guardian ad litem had 
taken over the case load of the first. The new guardian prepared a report for the court 
after consulting with the first guardian, the clinical consultant and after reading all the 
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documents the first guardian had amassed, including her interview notes. R.520-22. This 
report detailed how the relationship between the Mother and the Grandmother had 
deteriorated, how the business litigation fueled this deterioration and how the Child had 
no memory of the Grandmother. R.520-22. The Guardian concluded that the Mother 
appeared competent to make best interests decision regarding the Child, including who 
the Child should meet with or visit. The Guardian recommended against court-ordered 
visitation so long as the parties' animosity was heightened. R.522. 
The matter was heard in May 2001. R.524. The court heard live testimony, 
deposition testimony and received exhibits including the Guardian's report. R.524-25. 
The Guardian was unable to attend the hearing because she was in another courtroom at 
the time. However, she left word that she could be reached if necessary and agreed that 
the matter could proceed so long as her report was submitted. R.555 at 55. 
In its memorandum decision, the court denied the petition finding that visitation 
was not in the child's best interests. R.541-47. "In this case, the record contains facts 
sufficient for me to conclude that the best interests of [the Child] are best served by 
deferring to decisions made by her mother concerning visitation with the petitioner." 
Some of the reasons for denying visitation included the following: the Mother was 
capable of making best interests decisions; the relationship between the two women had 
deteriorated; there was no immediate prospect of things getting better; the Grandmother 
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wanted to introduce the Child to her two half-siblings against the wishes of the Mother; 
the Grandmother was responsible for the break down of her relationship with the Child; 
and the Child had no memory of the Grandmother. 
In discussing the relationship between the two women, the court noted, 
I agree with the guardian's conclusions, as I simply do 
not believe that [the Child] will be the beneficiary of court-
ordered visitation in the current climate of conflict and 
acrimony. I hasten to note that the conflict at issue here is not 
of the type addressed by the Court of Appeals in Campbell.1 
There, the court rejected the claims of stress and trauma 
associated with the grandparent visitation litigation as a basis 
for denying visitation, observing that the stress of the 
litigation would likely end when the litigation terminated. 
Here, the litigation creating the conflict between petitioner 
and Ms. Suitter is separate from and predated this action and 
may well survive it. 
Accordingly, based on Ms. Suitter's legitimate 
interests in defining [the Child's] relationship with her step-
siblings, Ms. Suitter's reasonable decision not to reintegrate 
the petitioner into her life or the life of [the Child] so long as 
animosity lingered over the business-related litigation, and 
petitioner's token efforts to maintain ties with [the Child], I 
conclude that [the Child's] best interests will not be served by 
granting grandparent visitation. 
The Grandmother appeals the denial of the visitation petition. R.548. 
Campbell v.Campbell 896 P.2d 635 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Grandmother seeks to retry the case by rearguing the evidence in her favor. 
She fails to marshal the evidence, state a standard of review, demonstrate whether the 
claim was preserved and state an appropriate appellate claim. The Grandmother faults 
the court for relying on insufficient evidence in denying the petition when it was she who 
had the burden of producing evidence. Finally, the Grandmother's claim regarding the 
role of the Guardian ad litem is without merit because (1) it is not an appellate claim; (2) 
it misstates the record and the law; and (3) it goes to sufficiency of the evidence. This 
Court should therefore affirm the denial of the visitation petition. 
ARGUMENT 
1. THE GRANDMOTHER RAISES NO APPELLATE CLAIM. 
The Grandmother claims the trial court relied on insufficient evidence to support 
its denial of the visitation petition. Without citing to the record, or to any case law, she 
reargues the facts in the light most favorable to her to establish her point. Grandmother's 
Brief at 11-14. In a related claim, the Grandmother claims the evidence was insufficient 
to support the court's finding that she made only token efforts to stay in contact with the 
Child. Grandmother's Brief at 14-15. 
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Utah law allows that a district court "may grant grandparents reasonable rights of 
visitation, if it is in the best interest of the grandchildren, in cases where a grandparent's 
child has died or has become a noncustodial parent through divorce or legal separation." 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-5-2(2). The subsection of the statute applies because the 
Grandmother's child has died and she was seeking visitation from the child's mother. 
The Grandmother does not challenge the application of the statute. She challenges 
the sufficiency of the evidence. To raise an insufficiency claim, the Grandmother must 
marshal all evidence supporting the challenged findings and then demonstrate how the 
marshaled evidence is legally insufficient to support the challenged findings. Campbell v 
Campbell 896 P.2d 635, 638 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
Here, the Grandmother challenges the visitation order. Thus she challenges 
virtually all the findings including: 
• The Mother should be the one to tell the Child about her father's history. 
• The Mother had a "strained" relationship with the Father's other children. 
• The Grandmother was likely to inform the Child of the existence of her half 
siblings and to encourage a relationship with them against the Mother's wishes. 
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• The relationship between the Mother and the Grandmother deteriorated after the 
death of the Father due to litigation involving the Mother's claims to an interest in a 
business owned by the Father's family. 
• The Grandmother "made little effort to reach out to [the Child] or [the Mother]. 
She made no meaningful attempts to send gifts to [the Child] or otherwise make contact 
with her." 
• The Child had no memory of the Grandmother. 
R.541-47. 
In adding up these findings, the court determined that the Child would not benefit 
from being required to visit the Grandmother "in the current climate of conflict and 
acrimony" which went beyond the visitation litigation and included the business 
litigation. 
Here, the Grandmother has not marshaled the evidence. Instead, she reargues the 
facts (without citing to the record) in the light most favorable to her position and asks this 
Court for a second opinion. That is not an appellate claim. 
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First, the Grandmother had the burden to produce, given that it was her petition. 
So any insufficiency argument becomes one of invited error. Moreover, the district court 
had evidence to support its denial of the petition. It heard live testimony and deposition 
testimony, it had the guardian's report and other exhibits. It also had the benefit of 
proffered evidence from prior hearings. The Grandmother has not marshaled any of this. 
This Court should decline to consider her claim and should defer to the district court in 
making this fact-intensive determination. 
2. THE GRANDMOTHER'S CLAIMS REGARDING 
THE GUARDIAN AD LITEM ARE NOT TRUE 
AND ARE NOT APPROPRIATE APPELLATE CLAIMS. 
The Grandmother claims the Guardian ad Litem did not provide appropriate 
representation. She does not frame this claim as an appellate claim, nor does she mention 
a standard of appellate review. 
First, problems with one's representation of a client are raised before the Utah 
State Bar, before the Director of the Office of the Guardian ad Litem, or they are raised 
as ineffectiveness of counsel claims. Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-911. Second, the claim 
was not raised to the trial court and thus was not preserved for appeal. State v. Holgate, 
2000 UT 74 K 11-14; Hart v. Salt Lake Co. Comm'n, 945 P.2d 125, 130 (Utah App. 
1997). 
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If one were to read an appellate claim into this issue, perhaps a case could be made 
for the Grandmother making a sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim.2 That is, the 
Grandmother is claiming that the court relied on insufficient evidence to make the best 
interest finding because the Guardian ad litem should have provided more evidence. If 
this is her claim, the Grandmother needs to marshal all the evidence supporting the 
challenged best interest finding and then demonstrate how the marshaled evidence is 
legally insufficient to support the finding. Campbell v. Campbell 896 P.2d 635, 638 
(UtahCt.App. 1995). 
Here, the Grandmother has not met the marshaling burden. The previous section 
marshals a portion of the evidence, which, in itself, is sufficient to support the district 
court's best interest finding. Accordingly, this Court should deem the evidence legally 
sufficient and should affirm the visitation order. 
A second reason to decline to consider the claim is the fact that the Grandmother 
has not preserved the issue of insufficiency of evidence. "As a general rule, to ensure 
that the trial court addresses the sufficiency of the evidence, a defendant must request that 
the court do so." Where the claim is sufficiency of the evidence, the appellant must first 
2This is an interesting claim given that the Grandmother had the burden of 
producing evidence to support her petition. If she is now claiming insufficient evidence, 
she is essentially conceding her point, or perhaps she is inviting error or both. 
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preserve it for review. Holgate, 2000 UT 74 f 143. Here, the Grandmother did not 
preserve the claim that the court relied on insufficient evidence to support its best 
interests findings, nor did the Grandmother preserve the claim that the Guardian relied on 
insufficient information in preparing her report. Accordingly, the Grandmother has 
waived any claim going to insufficient evidence. Hart, 945 P.2d at 130. 
The following is offered in the event this Court chooses to consider the role of the 
Guardian ad litem in district court civil cases. 
Recent case law has put in question the exact duties and responsibilities of the 
guardian ad litem in civil matters in district court cases. State v. Harrison 2001 UT 33. 
While Harrison dealt with the guardian's role in criminal cases, the guardian's role in 
civil cases remains governed by case law and by statute, which establish that where there 
are allegations of abuse and neglect, the guardian's duties and responsibilities shall be 
that of counsel for a party. In re J.W.F. v. Schoolcraft, 763 P.2d 1217, 1220-1221 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1988), rev'd on other grounds, 799 P.2d 710 (1990). In the present case, the 
district court appointed an attorney guardian ad litem to determine whether court-
3While the Holgate decision relies on Utah R. Crim. P. 17(o) regarding mandatory 
arrest of judgment for insufficiency of the evidence, the civil analogy would be Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-17-3 and Utah R. Civ. P. 59(a) regarding discretionary remedies for 
claims of insufficient evidence. 
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enforced visitation would be in the child's best interests or whether such visitation would 
be potentially abusive or negligent. 
In this case, the district court was emphatic that the case not proceed without the 
participation of a guardian ad litem. As early as January of 2000, the judge said "We 
aren't doing anything till we have a guardian ad litem." R.555 at 23-24. When in April 
2000, the judge learned that the Mother was not allowing the Guardian access to the 
Child, he continued the evidentiary hearing: "We're not going to have an evidentiary 
hearing (today) because the reality is the guardian ad litem is going to be on board. And 
I'm going to order cooperation with the guardian ad litem . . . the guardian ad litem . . . is 
now assigned the responsibility of giving me advice concerning the best interests of the 
child." R.555 at 38-39. 
The Guardian complied with her duties to the Child and to the court. That is, she 
researched available data bases for child abuse allegations against the petitioner. She 
interviewed the petitioner and the Child. She elicited the help of a clinical consultant. 
She familiarized herself with the case and with case law and she appeared at most of the 
hearings. R.520-22. While she did not appear at the evidentiary hearing, she had already 
submitted her report and she let the parties and the court know how she could be reached. 
R.555 at 55-56. If the Grandmother truly believed that the Guardian had not done her 
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duty she could have raised the matter to the trial court, with the Guardian herself, with 
the director of the Office of the Guardian ad Litem or with the Utah State Bar. 
It was the Grandmother who produced insufficient evidence to support her 
petition. When her petition failed, she chose to blame the Guardian for not siding with 
her. For these reasons, this Court should decline to consider her claim and should affirm 
the visitation order. 
ORAL ARGUMENT: PUBLICATION OF OPINION 
The Guardian ad Litem does not request oral argument or a published opinion 
because the Grandmother raises only factual issues and states no appellate claims. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, the Guardian moves this court to affirm the district 
court's visitation order. 
DATED this 7th day of January 2002. 
MARTHA PIERCE 
Guardian ad Litem 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 7 day of January 2002,1 caused to be mailed, postage 
prepaid, two true and exact copies of the Guardian ad Litem's Brief to: 
Brian W. Steffensen 
William J. Middleton 
2159 South 700 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, UT 84106 
Robert Copier 
243 East 400 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-2803
 ; ^~ - ; 
MARTHA PIERCE 
Guardian ad Litem 
ADDENDA 
1. Memorandum Decision entered July 9, 2001. R.541-47. 
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^ Judicial DfstncT 
JUL 8 - 2001 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
6ERI PASQUIN 
Petitioner, 
vs< 
KORY PASQUIN, deceased, and 
CANDICE M. SOUTER, 
Respondents. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE NO. 970910481 
Petitioner is the grandmother of Tori Lynn Pasquin, who was 
born in February, 1994, to the petitioner's son, Kory Pasquin, and 
Candice M. Souter. Kory Pasquin died in October, 2000. Petitioner 
brought this action to gain visitation rights with Tori Lynn 
pursuant to Section 30-5-2, Utah Code Ann. (1998). 
A hearing was held in this action on May 31, 2001. Having 
considered the evidence received at that hearing, together with the 
relevant law, I render the following Memorandum Decision which 
incorporates my findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
Utah's grandparent visitation statute creates two 
classifications of grandparents. The first comprises grandparents 
whose child has died or has become a non-custodial parent through 
PASQUIN V. SOUTER PAGE 2 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
divorce or legal separation. The second includes -all other-
grandparents'- Where, as here, the grandparent's- child is deceased, 
the grandparent may exercise reasonable rights of visitation based 
on a showing that visitation is in the best interests of the 
grandchild. Grandparents who fall in the second statutory category 
must overcome more rigorous requirements to obtain .court ordered 
visitation. In addition to demonstrating that visitation is In the 
best interests of the grandchild, the grandparent must, among other 
things* overcome by clear and convincing evidence a presumption 
that the parents''decision concerning visitation is reasonable. 
Although explicit deference to a-parent's -decision appears 
only in Section 30-5-2 (2>, governing grandparent visitation outside 
the context of death, divorce or legal separation, it is 
impossible, in my view, to disregard parental decision making«as an 
element of a best interest analysis applied under Section 30-5-
2(1). Put another way, it is difficult to image a situation in 
which a parent's reasonable decision to deny a grandparent 
visitation with a child would be contrary to the child's best 
interests. That is that case here. 
The importance of the parent-child relationship has been 
recognized by the Utah Court of Appeals in interpreting the 
PASQUIN V. SOUTER PAGE 3 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
predecessor to the current grandparent visitation statute. 
Campbell v. Campbell, 986 P.2d 635 (Utah App. 1995). In this case, 
the record contains facts sufficient for me to conclude that the 
best interests of Tori Lynn are best served by deferring to 
decisions made by her mother concerning visitation with the 
petitioner. 
Petitioner urges me to recognize that it is in Tori Lynn's 
best interest to learn about her father's life and to preserve his 
memory. Petitioner contends that she is best-equipped to 
accomplish this and eager to start. I agree, however, with 
respondent that Tori Lynn's father's history is best left to be 
communicated by her mother. Kori Pasquin fathered two other 
children with other women. The relationship between Ms. Souter and 
Kory Pasquin's other children, particularly Karly, is strained. On 
the other hand, the testimony strongly suggests that the petitioner 
would encourage the development of a relationship between Tori Lynn 
and her step-siblings. In my view, the questions of whether, when 
and how to inform Tori Lynn that she has step-siblings and of what, 
if any, relationship Tori Lynn should have with them is best left 
to Ms. Souter. 
It is also significant that following the death of Kory 
PASQUIN V. SOUTER PAGE 4 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Pasquin, the relationship between the Souters and the petitioner 
deteriorated in the face of litigation involving claims made by Ms. 
Souter to an interest in a business owned by the Pasquins. That 
litigation has not prevented Ms. Souter from maintaining a 
relationship with the petitioner's divorced husband who regularly 
visits Tori Lynn with Ms. Souter's consent. 
It is undisputed that petitioner had developed a friendship 
with Ms. Souter before the birth of Tori Lynn which continued 
through Mother's Day 1997. Ms. Souter would frequently visit 
petitioner at petitioner's place of work with Tori Lynn. 
After Mother's Day 1997, Ms. Souter ended the relationship. 
Irrespective of who might be at fault for ending the friendship, 
petitioner made little effort to reach out to Tori Lynn or Ms. 
Souter. She made no meaningful attempts to send gifts to Tori Lynn 
or otherwise make contact with her. 
Penny H. Breiman was appointed as guardian ad litem to 
represent the interests of Tori Lynn. Her successor, Robin Ravert, 
prepared a report and recommendations which was received in 
evidence at the hearing. According to the report, Ms. Breiman, 
together with Katina Temme, the clinical consultant to the guardian 
ad litem, interviewed Tori Lynn in June, 2000. At that time, Tori 
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Lynn had no memory of the petitioner, but it appeared that she had 
overheard disparaging remarks about her. The guardian ad litem 
recommended that visitation not be ordered with the petitioner 
based in part on the conflict between the parties which could be 
traced to the prior litigation involving the petitioner and Ms. 
Souter. I agree with the guardian's conclusions, as I simply do 
not believe that Tori Lynn will be the beneficiary of court-ordered 
visitation in the current climate of conflict and acrimony. I 
hasten to note that the conflict at issue here is not of the type 
addressed by the Court of Appeals in Campbell. There, the court 
rejected the claims of stress and trauma associated with the 
grandparent visitation litigation as a basis for denying 
visitation, observing that the stress of the litigation would 
likely end when the litigation terminated. Here, the litigation 
creating the conflict between petitioner and Ms. Souter is separate 
from and predated this action and may well survive it. 
Accordingly, based on Ms. Souter's legitimate interests in 
defining Tori Lynn's relationship with her step-siblings, Ms. 
Souter's reasonable decision not to reintegrate the petitioner into 
her life or the life of Tori Lynn so long as animosity lingered 
over the business-related litigation, and petitioner's token 
PASQUIN V. SOUTER PAGE 6 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
efforts to maintain ties with Tori Lynn, I conclude that Tori 
Lynn's best interests will not be served by granting grandparent 
visitation. 
Dated this *? day of July, 2001. 
'^JU^^d 
RONALD E. NEHRI 
DISTRICT COURT 
